About This Book

“A thoroughly documented study of the years of Hitler's triumph — which the author sees as anything but inevitable. He emphasizes Germany's economic difficulties — lack of raw materials and foreign exchange — and sees an objectively weak but strong-willed Germany challenge a strong but weak-willed West, with the British always relying on a worst case analysis of their military strength and a best case analysis of Hitler's intentions. An important study that in many ways returns to an earlier view that the West would have been in a better position to fight a war in 1938 than in 1939, that appeasement promoted what its proponents most feared: German aggression leading to protracted war. The author bolsters a familiar thesis with new evidence and great zeal.” — Foreign Affairs “Murray... [has] mastered an impressive range of archival and published sources... advances a robust, revisionist thesis. By a careful correlation of the economics of German rearmament with Hitler's foreign policy and strategy between 1933 and 1939, he makes a strong case that right up to the outbreak of war Germany was much less thoroughly prepared for a major war than most of her contemporary opponents imagine